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MEMORANDUM 
TO: Mr. Covert E. Parnell, III DATE: March 28, 1972 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
No. 70-220 Caplin v. Marine Midland 
Prior to the Conference on Friday, I would appreciate your 
taking a look at Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act and at the Trust 
Indenture Act of 1940. 
At oral argument, counsel for Marine Midland Bank asserted 
categorically that there is not a word in Chapter X which authorizes 
a trustee to sue on claims - not of the Debtor but of third parties who 
have claims against the Debtor. 
Counsel also asserted that the debenture holders were expressly 
authorized to sue the debenture trustee by provisions of the Trust 
sq 
Indenture Act of 19f/J. 
My own recollection is in accord with the latter statement, 
and my guess is that the former statement also is correct. But please 
take a look before Friday. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
lfp/ss lee 3/28/72 
.. 
No. 70-220 CAPLIN v. MARINE MIDLAND 
Argued 3/28/72 
Tentative Impressions* 
This case involves a question of "standing". Caplan, trustee 
under Chapter X of the bankrupt Webb and Knapp, Inc., brought suit 
against Marine Midland Bank (the Bank) seeking to recover the face 
amount of $4, 200, 000 of debentures issued by the Debtor. 
The Bank was trustee under the debenture agreement, which 
contained a covenant requiring a specified ratio of assets to liabilities. 
The Debtor was required when creating additional debt or buying 
additional real estate, to file affidavits with the trustee showing 
compliance with this covenant. The facts indicate that these affidavits 
were erroneous, and Caplan claims in this suit that the Bank was 
either grossly negligent or wilfully dishonest. 
Three suits have been instituted - one in a federal court - by 
holders of the debentures. Although discovery depositions have been 
taken in one of these cases, they have been held in abeyance pending 
the outcome of this case. 
*These impressions are dictated on the afternoon following argument 
to record my initial and tentative impressions. I will have read, 
in preparation for the arguments, the principal briefs, some of the 
cases and the bench memo. I hope to do further study before the 
Conference. My views are subject to change and to the discussion 
at the Conference. 
2. 
Caplan does not assert an exclusive right to sue, and concedes 
that these other suits by debenture holders may be maintained. He 
takes the position, however, that he is in the best position - being 
trustee of the Debtor - to know of the facts, and that he should be 
allowed to sue. He agrees that any recovery made will be turned over 
to the debenture holders. 
Counsel for Caplan asserts four reasons why trustee has 
authority to sue: 
1. The general scheme of the federal statutes. He refers 
to the Chandler Act, the Trust Indenture Act and other SEC legislation -
which are said to "focus in the trustee" authority to take all action 
on behalf of all creditors. 
2. Specific statutory authority. He refers to § 587 -which 
vests in the trustee all of the powers of an equity receiver, as giving 
him the right. 
3. Trustee is best informed. This is a pragmatic argument, 
based on possession of all facts and information. 
4. The Clark case, relied on by the Section Circuit, is said 
to be plainly wrong. 
Counsel for Marine Midland (Mr. Dickey) had the better of the 
argument. Some of his principal points were: 
3. 
1. Caplan's suit asserts no claim under the Trust Indenture 
Act or under any other federal act. In essence, it is a negligence 
suit -which could have been brought under state common law -alleging 
negligence and misconduct by a trustee. 
As contrasted with this, the debenture holders are expressly 
authorized to sue the trustee by provisions of the Trust Indenture Act. 
Caplan cannot bring a class action on behalf of all debenture 
h olders, as he is not a member of the class. 
Mr. Dickey asserted flatly that there is not a word in Chapter 
X which authorizes the trustee to bring a suit on behalf - not of the 
debtor corporation - but of a creditor of the debtor (namely, a bond-
holder). 
There is no showing that this suit facilitates the reorganization 
of the Debtor. Indeed, a plan or reorganization has been approved by 
the SEC and is now under consideration by the district court. It allows 
only a fractional recovery by these debenture holders (3% I believe), 
which means that they have a right - if they can prove their case - to 
recover 97% of the face amount of their bonds from the Bank. 
It is pointed out that if the Debtor's trustee has standing and 
the right to sue (which admittedly is not exclusively), there will be 
a multiplicity of suits. Question of priority between the suits will 
arise; questions of comity as between state and federal courts may 
exist; and problems involving class actions may also exist. 
My Tentative Conclusion: 
I would affirm Judge Friendly's opinion. 
4. 
-. 3/30/72 CEP 
MEMORANDUM 
Rea Your Memo of 3/28/72 concerning No, 70 .. 220, Caplin Y.• 
Marine Midland Grace Trust Co, 
(1) Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act 
The representation of counsel for Marine Midland that 
Chapter X does not specifically authorize the trustee to 
sue indenture trustees on claims of the holders of the 
indenture securities is of course correct, Were there 
such specific statutory authorization this case would not 
be here, The trustee finds his standing or authority in 
three places, two of which are significant& 
(a) The trustee finds explicit statutory authority 
in Section 187 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 USC 587, which 
provides a 
Where not inconsistent with the provi· 
sions of this chapter, a trustee , , , 
if authorized by the judge, shall have 
and may exercise such additional rights 
and powers as a receiver in equity would 
have if appointed by a court of the 
United States for the property of the 
debtor, 
The trustee contends that McCandless Y.• Furland, 296 
US 140 (1935), establishes that equity receivers 
have standing to sue third parties on behalf of 
bondholders. 
(b) The trustee also finds a right to sue in 
the fairly broad policy of _implied,'_ rights of action 
in order to effectuate the public policies under• 
lying the federal securities laws. Cf. J.I.Case Co. 
y. Borak, 377 US 426, 433 (1964), 
(2) The Trust Indenture Act of 1939 
I have .!!Q!;_ been able to locate a provision in the 
Trust Indenture Act which expressly authorizes holders 
of indenture securities to sue the indenture trustee, 
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MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
I will in due course circulate a dissent 












~idland Grac~ m~ ~~ ~ 
Cert to CA 2 tJ...o ~d: ~ ... 
Re: 1st draft of TM's Opinion for the 
Court 
TM's opinion seems to deal with the issues wellp and 
I find myself generally in agreement with it. WOD has 
indicated, however, that he will in due course circulate a 
dissent. Since this is a rather confusing case, I suggest 
that you await WOD's dissent before joining anyone. 
CEP 
To: The Chief Jus tlce 
Mr. Just i ce Douglas 
Mr. Jus"Uc e Bcr.,:;nan 
Mr. Just~.ce S ~.,e ~',art 
:Mr . J us·i;.i.ce rr. • .:_te 
Mr. J ustice }.J"l rlC l:mun 
Mr. J ustice Powell~ 
Mr. Justice Eelm q_uis 
1st DRAFT From: Marshall , J . 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITE:61ST1\~=_,.tt~fi_~:.h_.,__ 
Recirculated: 
No. 70-220 
Mortimer M. Caplin, etc., 
Petitioner, 
v. 
The Marine Midland Grace 
Trust Company of 
New York. 
On Writ of Certiorari to 
the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit. 
[April -, 1972] 
MR. JusTICE MARSHALL delivered the opm10n of the 
Court. 
The sole issue in this case is whether petitioner, the 
trustee in reorganization of Webb & Knapp, Inc. , has 
standing under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, 52 
Stat. 883, 11 U. S. C. § 501 et seq., to assert, on behalf 
of persons holding debentures issued by Webb & Knapp, 
claims of misconduct by an indenture trustee. The 
United States District Court for the Southern District 
of New York held that petitioner lacked the requisite 
standing, and the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit affirmed en bane, with two judges dissent-
ing, 439 F. 2d 118 (1971).1 We granted certiorari, -
U. S. - ( 1971), and we now affirm the decision of the 
Court of Appeals. 
1 The District Court delivered three separate opinions in thi~ ca~c. 
They are unreported, but arc included in the appendix prepared by 
the parties at pp. 58a-70a. The Court of Appeals heard the case 
en bane after a panel of three judges determined that it was inclined 
to overrule the case on which the District Court had placed almost 
exclusive reliance. 439 F. 2d, at 118. 
-------
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I 
Webb & Knapp and its numerous subsidiaries were 
engaged in various real estate activities in both the 
United States and Canada. In 1954, the corporation 
executed an indenture 'vith respondent, the Marine Mid-
land Trust Company of Now York ("Marine"), that pro-
vided for the issuance by Webb & Knapp of 5o/o deben-
tures in the total amount of $8,607,500. A critical part 
of the indenture was tho promise by Webb & Knapp 
that neither it nor any company affiliated with it" would 
incur or assume "any indebtedness resulting from money 
borrowed or from the purchase of any real property or 
interests in real property . . . or purchase any real 
property or interests in real property" unless tho com-
pany's consolidated tangible assets, as defined in the 
indenture, equaled 200/'0 of certain liabilities, after giv-
ing effect to the contemplated indebtedness or purchase.'l 
By requiring the company to maintain an asset-liability 
ratio of 2:1, the indenture sought to protect debenture 
purchasers by provicli11g a cushion against any losses 
that tho company might suffer in the ordinary course 
of business. In order to demonstrate continuing com-
pliance with the requiremeuts of the indenture, Webb 
& Knapp covenanted to file an annual certificate with 
Marine stating whether tho corporation (debtor) had 
defaulted on any of its responsibilities under tho in-
denture during the proceeding year.1 
2 Those companies in the affiliated group include nny corporation 
that. \Yas entitled to be included in n comolidated tnx return of Wrbb 
& Knapp. Sec 26 U. S. C. § 1502. Section 1.1 of the Indenture 
gave Webb & Knapp authority to consider other compnnirs ns 
nffiliatcs if it chose to do so. 
:J Indenture of June 1, 1954, Webb & Knapp, Inc. to The Mnrine 
Midland Trust Company of New York § 3.6 (hereinafter refrrrcd· 
to as Indenture). 
4 Indenture§ 3.11. 
70-220-0PINIO N 
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In its role as indenture trustee, Marine undertook "in I 
case of default ... to exercise such of the rights and 
po,Yers vested in it by [the] Indenture, and to use the 
same degree of care and skill in their exercise, as a 
prudent man would exercise or use under the circum-
stances in the conduct of his own affairs."" This under-~ 
taking was qualified by language in the indenture which 
permitted the trustee to rely on the accuracy of certifi-
cates or reports of Webb & Knapp, in the absence of bad 
faith.c 
Commencing in 1959, Webb & Knapp sustained sub-
stantial financial losses in every year.7 Finally, on May 
7, 1965, Marine filed a petition in district court seeking 
the involuntary reorganization of Webb & Knapp under 
Chapter X of the Bankruptcuy Act, 11 U. S. C. § 501 
et seq. Pursuant to § 208 of Chapter X, 11 U. S. C. 
§ 608, the Securities and Exchange Commission inter-
vened on May 10, 1965.R Marine's petition was sub- ( 
sequently approved and petitioner was appointed trustee 
in reorganization on May 18, 1965. 
With the approval of the District Court, petitioner 
exercised the powers conferred upon him by 11 U. S. C. 
§ 567 and undertook an extensive investigation of the 
financial affairs of \Yebb & Knapp. His investigation 
5 Indenture § lO.la. This wns also a statutory duty. See 15 
U. S. C. § 77ooo. 
G Indenture§ 10.1 (d). 
1 Webb & Knapp showed a loss for tax purposes earh year, nl-
though the compnny did show a gnin on its books for 1961 at-
tributable to a write-up of property owned by a wholly-owned sub-
sidiary of a company in whieh Webb & Knapp held 50% of the 
stock. 
s The SEC has supported petitioner throughout this litigation. 
The agency is "an unnamed respondent before this Court." See 
Protective Committee v. Anderson, 390 U. S. 414, 420 n. 3 (1968). 
'Vhen referring to arguments made by petitioner, this opinion as-
sumes, unless otherwise stated, that the SEC has made the same 
arguments. 
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showed that the company had total assets of $21,538,621 
and total liabilities of $60.036,164, plus contingent tax 
liabilities of $29,400,000. Included among the liabilities 
were the 1954 debentures in the principal amount of 
$4,298,200 plus i11terest subsequent to the inception of 
the reorganization proceeding.0 
The investigation led petitioner to conclude that Marine 
had either wilfully or negligently failed to fulfill its 
obligations under the indenture. Petitioner supported 
his conclusion with the following allegations: that from 
1954 to 1964, Webb & Knapp's yearly certificates of 
compliance with the 2:1 asset-liabiiity raho mandated 
by the indenture were fraudulent, because they were -based on grossly overvalued appraisals of real estate 
property; that from 19.58 to 1964, Webb & Knapp did 
not have sufficient assets to comply with the terms of the 
indenture; that Marine should have known or did know 
of the inflated appraisals; and that because Marine per-
mitted Webb & Knapp to violate the indenture by en-
gaging in transactions which its impaired asset-liability 
ratio forbid, Webb & Knapp suffered great financial 
losses.10 
Having obtained the approval of the District Court, 
petitioner filed an independent action on behalf of the 
debenture holders against Marine seeking to recover the 
principal amount of the outstanding debentures as dam-
ages for Marine's alleged bad faith failure to compel 
compliance with the terms of the indenture by Webb & 
Knapp. Petitioner also filed a counterclaim in the same 
0 The difference between thi · nmount and the amount of the de-
bentures originally issued represents the amount of the principal 
which Webb & Knapp had repaid. 
10 These are merely allegations of petitioner, not findings of the 
lower courts. Because the Di::;trict Court and the Court of Appeals 
held that petitioner had no standing, they had no occnsion to con-
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amount against Marine in the reorganization proceeding 
in which Marine had previously filed a claim for services 
rendered. In the reorganization proceeding, petitioner 
also filed an objection to the claim for services rendered 
on the ground that even if petitioner could not obtain an 
affirmative recovery against Marine on behalf of the 
bondholders, he could at least raise Marine's bad faith 
conduct as a reason why the claim for services rendered 
should be denied. u Finally, petitioner moved to compel 
an accounting by Marine. 
Marine moved to dismiss the independent action and 
the counterclaim, moved to strike the objection to the 
claim for services rendered, and opposed the motion to 
compel an accounting. The District Court found that 
petitioner had no standing in his capacity as a trustee in 
reorganization under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act 
to raise claims of misconduct by an indenture trustee on 
behalf of debenture holders and granted both of Marine's 
motions to dismiss. Viewing the motion to compel on 
accounting as merely a third vehicle to raise the same 
claim on behalf of the debenture holders, the District 
Court denied that motion also. Only petitioner's objec-
tion to the claim for services rendered was left standing.1 2 
Petitioner appealed the dismissal of his claims and the 
denial of his motion for an accounting to the Court of 
11 In its capacity as indenture trustee, Marine also filed a claim 
on behalf of all the debenture holders for the unpaid principal on 
the debentures. 
1 2 This objection differs from the other claims in one respect: 
i. e., it is an attempt to preserve the remaining aosets of the debtor 
for all creditor~ other than Marine, whereas the other claiml:i repre-
sent an attempt by the petitioner to increase the assets of the debtor 
for the benefit of a specific class of creditors, the debenture holders. 
Although Marine appealed the ruling of the District Court denying 
its motion to strike the objection, it did not seek review here of the 
decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the District Court on 
this issue. This issue is, therefore, not before us, and we offer no. 
opinion on the propriety of the lower courts' ruling. 
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Appeals. Marine filed a cross-appeal from the denial of 
its motion to strike petitioner's objection to the claim 
for services rendered. The Court of Appeals affirmed 
the derision of the District Court in its entirety. 
II 
The issue confronting us has never before been pre- } 
sented to this Court. It is an issue that has only rarely 
been presented to other courts, and on those rare occa-
sions, it has caused even the most able jurists to disagree. 
The first time the issue arose was in Clar·he v. Chase Na-
tional Bank, 137 F. 2d 797 (CA2 1943). Judge Augustus 
Hand wrote the opinion of the court holding that a 
trustee in reorganization did not have standing to suo -a third party on behalf of bondholders. Judge Learned 
Hand disagreed and dissented. It is this decision that 
the lower courts found controlling in the instant case. ~ 
The Clarke rase is, in fact, the only other case in which 
the issue that is raised here is squarely presented.' ~ The 
issue is a difficult one, and as we point out later, it is 
one that is capable of resolution by explicit congressional 
13 Petitioner and the two dissenting judges in the Court of Appeals 
argue thnt the issue wn~ presented in Prudence-Bonds Corp. v. State 
Street Trust Co., 202 F. 2d 555 (CA2) , cert. denied, 346 U. S. 835 
(1953), nnd that the decision of the court in that rase by Judge 
Learned Hand overruled Clarke v. Chase National Bank, supra, sub 
silentio. They also argue that the issue wns presented and decided 
contrary to Clarke in In re Solar Manufacturing Corp., 200 F. 2d 
327 (CA3 1952), cert. denied, sub nom. Marine Midland Trust Co. 
v. McGirl, 345 U. S. 940 (1953). But, the majority of the Court 
of Appenls found these en~es to be distinguishnble, and Marine urges 
that the majority was correct. We do not intend to become en-
meshed in this eontroYCrsy and merely indicate its existence to 
demonstrate thnt not only is there a di1·ision of opinion among 
lower courts on the issue, but there is also a split of opinion nmong 
able judges on the manner in which the lower courts diYide. 
70-220-0PINION 
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action. Lacking a specific legislative statement on this 
issue, ''"e must resolve it as best we can by examining the 
nature of Chapter X proceedings, the role of the trustee 
in reorganization, and the way in ''"hich standing to sue 
on behalf of debenture holders would affect or change 
that role. 
Chapter X, enacted in 1938, stemmed from a compre-
hensive SEC study that disclosed widespread abuses under 
the then existing provisions for business reorganizations. 
Sec Securities and Exchange Commission, Report on the 
Study and Investigation of the Work, Activities, Per-
sonnel, and Functions of Protective and Reorganization 
Committees ( 1937-1940). This same study gave birth 
the following year to the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 
53 Stat. 1149, 15 U. S. C. ~ 77aaa, which is discussed 
infra. 
In enacting Chapter X, Congress had protection of 
public investors primarily in mind. SEC v. American 
Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U. S. 594 (1965). "The aims 
of Chapter X ... "·ere to afford greater protection to 
creditors and stockholders by providing greater judicial 
control over the entire proceedings and impartial and 
expert administrative assistance in corporate reorganiza-
tions through appointment of a disinterested trustee and 
the active participation of the SEC." !d., at 604. In 
contradistinction to a bankruptcy proceeding where liqui-
dation of a corporation and distribution of its assets is 
the goal, a Chapter X proceeding is for purposes of re-
habilitating the corporation and reorganizing it. Ibid. 
Chapter X proceedings are not limited to insolvent 
corporations but arc open to those corporations that are 
solvent in the bankruptcy (asset-liability) sense but are 
unable to meet their obligations as they mature. United 
States Y. Key, 307 U. S. 322, 329 (1970); 11 U. S. C. 
~ 530 ( 1). 
' . 
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The trustee in reorganization is the center of the stat-
utory scheme. H. Rep. No. 1409, 75th Cong. , 1st Sess., 
43, 44. 11 U. S. C. § 567 gives the trustee broad powers: 
"The trustee upon his appointment and qualifi-
cation-
"(1) shall. if the judge shall so direct, forthwith 
investigate the acts, conduct, property, liabilities, 
and financial condition of the debtor, the operation 
of its business and the desirability of the continu-
ance thereof, and any other matter relevant to the 
proceeding or to the formulation of a plan, and 
report thereon to the judge; 
"(2) may, if the judge shall so direct, examine the 
directors and officers of the debtor and any other 
witnesses concerning the foregoiug matters or any 
of them; 
"(3) shall report to the judge any facts ascer-
tained by him pertaining to fraud , misconduct, mis-
management and irregularities, and to any causes 
of action available to the estate; 
" ( 5) shall. at the earliest date practicable, pre-
pare and submit a brief statement of his investiga..: 
tion of the property, liabilities, and financial condi-
tion of the debtor, the operation of its business and 
the desirability of the continuance thereof, in such 
form and manner as the judge may direct, to the 
creditors, stockholders, indenture trustees, the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission, and such other 
persons as the judge may designate; and 
"(6) shall give notice to the creditors and stock-
holders that they may submit to him suggestions 
for the formulation of a plan, or proposals in the 
form of plans, vvithin a time therein named." 
11 U. S. C. § 587 expands these powers: 
"Where 11ot inconsistent with the provisions of 
this chapter, a trustee, upon his appointment and 
' . 
70-220-0PINION 
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qualification, shall be vested with the same rights, 
be subject to the same duties, and exercise the same 
powers as a trustee appointed under section 72 of 
this title, and, if authorized by the judge, shall havo 
and may exercise such additional rights and powers 
as a receiver in equity would have if appointed by 
a court of the United States for the property of the 
debtor." 
The powers given a trustee appointed under ~ 72 are set 
forth in a footnote.'• Petitioner argues that these powers 
are broad enough to encompass a suit on behalf of de-
11 11 U. S. C. § 110 gives the trustee title to the following· 
"property": 
"(a) The Trustee of the estate of a bankrupt and his successor 
or successors, if any, upon his or their appointment and qualification, 
shall in tum be vested by operation of law with the title of the 
bankrupt as of the date of the filing of the petition initiating a 
proceeding under this Act . . . to all of the following kinds of 
property wherever located ( 1) documents relating to his property; 
(2) interests in patents, patent rights, copyrights, and trade-marks, 
and in applications therefor ... (3) powers which he might have· 
exercised for his own benefit, but not those which he might have 
exercised solely for some other person; ( 4) property transferred by 
him in fraud of his creditors; (5) property, including rights of 
action, which prior to the filing of the petition he could by any 
means have transferred or which might have been levied upon and 
sold under judicial proceRs against him, or otherwise seized, im-
pounded, or sequestered ... (6) rights of action arising upon con-
tracts, or usury, or the unlawful taking or detention of or injury 
to his property; (7) contingent remainders, executory devises and 
limitations, rights of entry for condition broken, rights or possibili-
ties of reverter, and like interests in real property, which were non-
assignable prior to bankruptcy and which, within six months there-
after, become assignable interests or estates or give ri~e to powers· 
in the bankrupt to acquire assignable interests or estates; and 
(8) property held by an assignee for the benefit of creditors ap-
pointed under an assignment which constituted an act of bank-
ruptcy, which properly shall, for the purpose~ of this Act, be deemed\ 
to be held by the assignee as the agent of the bankrupt and shall 
be subject to the summary jurisdiction of the court." 
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bcnture holders against an indenture trustee who has 
acted in bad faith, and who has, therefore, violated the 
Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U. S. C. § 77aaa. 
As pointed out above, the Trust Indenture Act was 
passed one year after Chapter X was enacted. Prior to 
its enactment, investment trustees immunii'-cd themselves 
from any liability for either deliberate or negligent mis-
conduct by writing exculpatory provisions into the in-
denture. Even in cases where misconduct by the in-
denture trustee was the proximate cause of injury to 
debenture holders, they found themselves impotent under 
the terms of most indentures to take action against the 
trustee. See generally 2 Loss, Securities Regulation 719-
725 (2d ed. 1961). This problem a.nd others arc specif-
ically mentioned in 15 U. S. C. § 77bbb as establi~hing 
a necessity for regulation. 
The regulation provided by the Act takes many forms. 
15 U. S. C. § 77cce requires that '"hencvcr securities cov-
ered by the Trust Indenture Act are also covered by the 
registration provisions of the Securities Act of 1033, 48 
Stat. 74, 15 U. S. C. ~ 77a, certain infonnation about the 
indenture trustee and the terms of the indenture must 
be included in the registration statement. 15 U. S. C. 
~ 77ggg provides that when securities are not registered 
under the 1933 Act but are covered by the Trust In-
denture Act, the indenture must be "qualified" by the 
~EC before it is legal to sell the securities. Standards for 
eligibility and disqualification of a trustee are estab-
lished by 15 U. S. C. § 77jjj, and the duties and re-
sponsibilities of a trustee arc enumerated in 15 U. S. C. 
§ 77ooo.1 "' 
1
"' The SEC is given general supervisory powers over indentures 
in ,·:uious sections of the Trust Indenture Art. Sec, e. g., 15 
U.S. C. §§77ddd(c), (d), (c); 7iccc(n), (c); 77ggg; 77ss~; 77ttt; 
77uuu. In addition, 15 U. S. C. § 77hhh prO\· ides that the SEC 
may order consolidation of reports or certfiicatcs filed under the 
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The indenture giving rise to this · igation was quali-
fied by the SRC pursuant to the T ust Indenture Act of 
1930. By alleging that the ind nture trustee acted in 
bad faith in failing to prevent ebb & Knapp from vio-
lating the terms of the inclet ure, petitioner clearly al-
leges a violation of the 19 9 legislation, 15 U. S. C. 
~ 77ooo."' But, the questi 1 remains whether petitioner 
is a proper party to take orrective action." 
Petitioner urgrs that e reorganization trustee is in 
a far better position t debt investors to discover and 
to prosecute claims based on the alleged failure of an 
indenture trustee to live up to the provisions of the in-
denture. He points to 11 U. S. C. ~ 567, set forth infra, 
and emphasizes that not only does the reorganization 
trustee have possession of the records of the debtor, but 
he also has a statutory duty to investigate the debtor's 
affairs and to "report to the judge any facts ascerta· 
by him pertaining to fraud, misconduct, misma ement 
and irregularities, and to any causes of a · n available 
to the estate." Reference is made to 15 U. S. C. 
Trust Indenture Act with information or documents filed under the 
Seruritie~ Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74, 15 U. S. C. § 77a et seq., and 
the Srruritie;; Exch:111ge Art of 193-t, 48 Stat. 881, 15 U. S. C. § 78a 
et seq., the Public Utility Holding Compan~' Art of 193.5, -l-9 Stat. 
838, 15 U.S. C.§ 79 et seq. 
1 r. The provisions of the indenture discussed preYiously comply 
with the requirements of 15 U. S. C. § 77ooo. While the indenture 
trustee is not permitted by the statute to exculpate himRdf from 
liability for acts done or omitted in bad faith, the indenture tru tee 
may rely in good faith on certificates or reports filed pursuant to 
the indenture and in compliance with the provisions thereof. 
17 We assume arguendo that violation of 15 U. S. C. § 77ooo would 
give rise to a cau~e of action against an indenture trustee by de-
benture holders. If there is a cause of action, 15 U. S. C. § 77vvv 
would seem to give federal courts exclusive jurisdiction. The court 
of appeals inferred that such suits would be proper, 439 F. 2d, at 
123 n. 5, but did not decide the point. Since we conclude that even 
if such suits may be brought, petitioner lacks standing to bring them, 
we do not decide the issue. 
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§ 77bbb (a)(l) which states that one of the problems 
Congress saw with respect to misconduct by indenture 
trustees was that "(A) individual action by . .. in-
vestors for the purpose of protecting and enforcing their 
rights is rendered impracticable by reason of the dis-
proportionate expense of taking such action, and (B) con-
certed action by such investors in their common interest 
through representation of their own selection is impeded 
by reason of the wide dispersion of such investors through 
many States, and by reason of the fact that information 
as to the names and addresses of such investors generally 
is not available to such investors." 18 
Finally, petitioner asserts that to give him standing 
to sue on behalf of debenture holders will not encourage 
vexatious litigation nor unduly deplete the resources of 
the debtor which he has been appointed to reorganize. 
He supports the first half of this proposition by noting 
that any action he takes is subject to the supervision 
of the District Court and to intervention by the SEC. 
The second half of the proposition finds support in the 
argument discussed above that petitioner already has a 
duty of investigation and that the minimal additional 
burden of prosecuting a lawsuit will not be great. 
At first blush petitioner's theory, adopted in the opin- ~ 
ion of the dissenters in the Court of Appeals, seems rea-
sonable. But, there are three problems with petitioner's 
18 It should be noted that the Trust Indenture Act of 1939 was 
enacted on August 3, 1939. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
were not even two year,; old, having been adopted by this Court 
on December 20, 1937. The class action was a comparatively re-
cent phenomenon with respect to damage actions and its was not 
tremendously helpful in the early days. See, e. g., Moore, Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure: Some Problems Raised by the Preliminary 
Draft, 25 Geo. L. J. 551, 570-576 (1937); Kalven & Rosenfield, 
The Contemporary Functions of the Class Suit, 8 U. Chi. L. Rev, 
684 (1941). It could not be said that the class action was an ef~ 
ficacious remedy in 1939. 
' . 
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argument and these problems requires that his position 
be rejected. 
F~t, Congress has established an elaborate system 
of controls with respect to indenture trustees and re-
organization proceedings, and nmvhere in the statutory 
scheme is there any suggestion that the trustee in re-
organization is to assume the responsibility of suing third 
parties on behalf of debenture holders. The language, \ 
in fact, indicates that Congress had no such intent in 
mind. The statute, 15 U. S. C. § 567 (3), gives the 
trustee the right, and indeed the duty, to investigate 
fraud and misconduct and to report to the judge the 
potential causes of action "available to the estate." 
Even assuming that this section is read as if the quoted 
words were not present, and that it authorizes a trustee 
in reorganization to report whether he believes an in-
denture trustee has violated a duty to third-party de-
benture holders, there is nothing in the section that 
enables him to collect money not owed to the estate. 
Nor is there anything in 11 U. S.C. § 110, set fortl'iin 
full in footnote 13, supra, that gives him this authority. 
His task is simply "to collect and reduce to money the 
property of the estates for which [he is trustee]." 11 
U.S. C.§ 75. 
The only support petitioner finds in the relevant stat-
utes is in that portion of 11 U. S. C. § 587 which gives 
reorganization trustees the additional rights that a "re-
ceiver in equity would have if appointed by a court of 
the United States for the property of the debtor." Peti-
tioner relies on McCandless v. Furlaud, 296 U. S. 140. 
( 1935) , to support the proposition that a receiver in 
equity may sue third parties on behalf of bondholders. 
But, the opinion of the Court by Mr. Justice Cardozo 
clearly emphasizes that the receiver in that case was 
suing on behalf of the corporation, not third parties; he 
was simply stating the same claim that the corporation 
70-220-0PINION 
14 CAPLIN v. MARINE MIDLAND GRACE TRUST CO. 
could have made had it brought suit prior to entering 
receivership.l!' The debtor corporation makes no such 
claim in this case. Sec generally 3 Clark, Receivers§ 362, 
at 619 (3d eel. 1959). 
This brings us to the second problem with petitioner's I 
argument. Nowhere docs petitioner argue that Webb 
& Knapp could make any claim against Marine. Indeed,. 
the conspicuous silence on this point is a tacit admission 
that no such claim could be made.~" Assuming that all 
of petitioner's allegations of misconduct on the part of 
the indenture trustee arc true, petitioner has at most 
described a situation "·here Webb & Knapp and Marine 
were in pari delicto. Whatever damage the debenture 
holders suffered, under petitioner's theory Webb & Knapp 
is as much at fault as Marine, if not more so. A ques-
tion would arise, therefore, " ·hethcr Marine would be 
entitled to be subrogated to the claims of the debenture 
holders. The Court of Appeals thought that subrogation 
would be required, 439 F. 2d, at 122. 
If the Court of Appeals is correct, it is then difficult 
to see \Yhat advantage there is in giving petitioner 
1 n This point is especially clear in light of the fact that the Court 
~plit 5-4 on whether Old Dominion Copper Co. v. Lewisohn, 210 
U.S. 206 (1908) (Holmes, J.), was binding in McCandless v. Fur-
laud. The issue in the contro,·er~ial Old Dominion case was whether 
a corporation had a cause of action against promoter-director-
stockholders. 
20 If petitioner could ~uc on behalf of Webb & Knapp, the statute 
that requires that he report pos~ible cause~ of action to the court 
would require mention of thi,; cause of action. 1\'Ioreo\'er, peti-
tioner has brought e,·ery comeivable claim that is a,·ailable to him 
as trustee. Not only has he brought these actions on behalf of the 
indenture trustees, but he has also sued former officer· of Webb & 
Kapp charging them with waste. Brief for SEC 5-6. Certain settle-
mcnts have apparently been made in some of these other actions. 
Brirf for Rc8pondcnt 45 11. lR 
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standing to sue. for as Chief Judge Friendly noted in his 
opinion for the court below: 
'·It is necessary in the first instance to consider 
what effect a recovery by the Chapter X Trustee 
" ·ould have on the reorganization. On a superficial 
view this might seen1. substantial-if, for example, 
the Chapter X Trustee were to achieve a complete 
recovery, the debenture holders would be paid off 
and it might seem that there \vould be that much 
more for the other creditors and the stockholders. 
But this pleasant pmspect speedily evaporates when 
the law of subrogation is brought into play. As a 
result of subrogation, Marine would simply be sub-
stituted for the debenture holders as the claimant. 
Cf. ALI, Restatement of Security § 141 (1941). If 
the Chapter X Trustee recovered judgment in a 
lesser amount, the claim of the debenture holders 
would still be provable in full, with the division of 
the proceeds between them and Marine dependent 
upon the results of the reorganization, and other 
creditors or stockholders "·ould not be affected." 
430 F. 2d, at 122. 
Even if the Court of Appeals is incorrect in its view of 
the propriety of subrogation under the facts of this case, 
the fact remains that in every reorganization there is 
going to be a question of how 111uch the trustee in re-
organization should be permitted to recover on behalf 
of the debenture holders. The answer is, of course, 
whatc,·cr he cannot recoup from the corporation. Once 
this is recognized, the wisdom of Judge Augustus Hand 
in Clarke v. Chase 1\/ational Bank, 137 F. 2d, at 800, be-
comes readily apparent: 
"Each creditor, including the debenture-holders, 
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the extent that a debenture-holder fails to satisfy 
it from the bankruptcy estate will he suffer a loss 
from which he can assert through the defendant 
through its failure to enforce the negative covenants." 
In other \vorcls debenture holders '""ill not be able to re-
cover damages from the indenture trustee until the re-
organization is far enough along so that a reasonable 
approximation can be made as to the extent of their 
losses, if any. It is ditlicult to see precisely why it is 
at that point that the trustee in reorganization should 
represent the interests of the debenture holders, who are 
capable of deciding for themselves whether or not it is 
"·orthwhile to seek to recoup whatever losses they may 
have suffered by an action against the indenture trustee. 
Petitioner appears to concede that any suit by debenture 
holders would not affect the interests of other parties to 
the reorganization assuming that the Court of Appeals 
is correct on the subrogation point. It would seem, 
therefore, that the debenture holders, the persons truly 
affected by the suit against Marine, should make their 
own assessment of the respected advantages and dis-
advantages not only of litigation, but of various theories 
of litigation. 
This brings us to the third problem with petitioner's 
argument: i. e., a suit by him on behalf of debenture 
holders may be inconsistent with any independent actions 
that they might bring themselves. Petitioner and the 
SEC make very plain their position that a suit by the 
trustee in reorganization Q.Qes not preempt suits by in-
dividual debenture holders. They maintai'i1;however, 
that it would be unlikely that such suits would be brought 
since the debenture holders could reasonably expect that 
the trustee would vigorously prosecute the claims of all 
debt investors. But, independent actions are still likely 
because it is extremely doubtful that the trustee and all 
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debenture-holders would agree on the amount of damages 
to seek or even on the theory on which to sue. 21 More-
over, if the indenture trustee "vins the suit brought by 
the trustee in reorganization, unless the debenture holders 
are bound by that victory, the proliferation of litigation 
that petitioner seeks to avoid would then ensue. 22 Fi-
nally, a question would arise as to who was bound by any 
settlement. 23 
21 Three private nctions hnve been brought by debenture holders 
again~t Marine, one in federal court and two in slate court. See 
Brief for Petitioner 21 n. 9. These suits make the same claims made 
by the petitioner in the instant case, as well as others which he 
has not made, including alleged violations of the securities laws. 
22 The trustee may well have interests that differ from tho ·e of 
the bondholdrrs. For example, petitioner has sued not only Marine, 
but also the former officers of Webb & Knapp. In settling the 
suits brought ngainst the officers, petitioner may well take positions: 
that conflict with those he would take in a suit against Marine. 
The conflict may at times be unfavorable to the debenture holders. 
One answer obviously is that the District Court and the SEC can 
take action to prevent any such conflict from developing, e. g., by 
denying the trustee in reorganization the right to sue on behalf of 
debenture holders in selected cases. The problem with this answer 
is that the conflict may not appear until the suit is well underway. 
In such a case the debenture holders might regret placing their 
confidence in the trustee. 
23 Chapter X, 11 U. S. C. § 616 (2), provides that a plan for 
reorganization "may deal with all or any part of the property of 
the debtor." It also provides that the plan "may include provisions' 
for the settlement or adjustment of claims belonging to the debtor 
or to the estate." 11 U.S. C.§ 616 (13). Despite these provisions, 
petitioner urges that he can settle a suit on behalf of bondholders 
without binding them to the settlrment. But, as pointed out in the 
text, supra, petitioner only has authority to pursue claims belong-
ing to estate. Petitioner is thus caught on the horns of a dilemma; 
either he is incorrect in asserting that the statutory definition of 
duties should be read so broadly as to allow a trustee in reorg:miza-
tion to treat claims by debenture holders against third parties as 
sufficiently relrtted to the estates that the trustee may sue on behalf 
of the debenture holders; or he is correct, and § 616 would appear 
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Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
which provides for class actions, avoids some of these 
difficulties. It is surely a powerful remedy and one that 
is available to all debenture holders.~4 Some of the 
factors that formerly deterred such actions have been 
changed by the Trust Indenture Act of 1939. 15 U.S. C. 
~ 77lll, for example, now requires that the debtor cor-
poration maintain lists of debenture holders which it 
must turn over to the indenture trustees at regular in-
tervals. Such lists are available to the individual de-
benture holders upon request. Debenture holders would 
also be able to take advantage of any information ob-
tained by the trustee in reorganization as a result of the 
investigation which the statute requires that he make. 
In addition, petitioner himself maintains that counsel 
fees '"oulcl be recoverable if the action was successful. 
Brief for Petitioner 20; cf. 1.5 U. S. C. § 77nnn. 
Thus, there is no showing whatever that by giving peti- '\~ 
tioner standing to sue on behalf of the debenture holders J\ 
to permit him to bind the debenture holders to u settlement. Even 
if petitioner ran have it both wa~rs, his inability to bind the pcrl:lons 
on whose brha lf he sues undercuts the utility of his suing. Because 
i he debenture holders could bring a class action and bind all mem-
bers of i he class, they can make a binding settlement and avoid 
lengthy and expensive litigation. Petitioner cannot make such a 
settlement. Moreover, if a reorganization trustee docs settle a suit 
that he has brought on behalf of debenture holders, he may find 
that rather than serving as their representative, he is forced to 
oppose their interests when they bring independent actions to re-
cover more than the settlement figure. In this event, the reorgani-
zation trustee would be forced to justify his settlement, and he would 
theoretically join the indenture trustee in opposing the action of 
the debenture holders. He would find himself on both sides of the 
same transaction. 
21 Again we assume arguendo that the Trust Indenture Act gives 
a right of action to debenture holders under these circumstances, 
Ob,·iously, if the debenture holders themseh·es have no cause of 
art ion, their surrogate is in no bet tcr position. 
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we would reduce litigation. On the contrary, there is 
every indication that litigation would be increased, or at 
least complicated. 
III 
For the reasons discussed above we conclude that peti-
tioner does not have standing to sue an indenture 
trustee on behalf of debenture holders. This does not 
mean that it would be unwise to confer such standing 
on trustees in reorganization. It simply signifies that 
Congress has not yet indicated even a scintilla of an in-
tention to do so, and that such a policy decision must 
be left to Congress and not to the judiciary. 
Congress might well decide that reorganizations have 
not fared badly in the 34 years since Chapter X was 
enacted and that the status quQ.Js preferable to inviting 
new problems by making changes in the system. Or, 
Congress could determine that the trustee in a reorgani-
zation was so well situated for bringing suits against in-
denture trustees that he should be permitted to do so. 
In this event, Congress might also determine that the 
trustee's action was exclusive, or that it should be brought 
as a class action on behalf of all debenture holders, or 
perhaps even that the debenture holders should have the 
option of suing on their own or having the trustee sue on 
their behalf. Any number of alternatives are available. 
Congress would also be able to answer questions regard-
ing subrogation or timing of law suits before these ques-
tions arise in the context of litigation. Whatever the 
decision, it is one that only Congress can make. 
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
Affirmed. 
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The Marine Midland Grace 
Trust Company of 
New York. 
On Writ of Certiorari to 
the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit. 
[April -, 1972] 
MR. JusTICE DouGLAS, dissenting. 
With all respect, today's decision reflects a misunder-
standing of the important role which a reorganization 
trustee under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 
U. S. C. § 567, is supposed to perform. Prior to Chap-
ter X the debtor had usually remained in possession; and 
Chapter X effected a basic change in putting a dis-
interested trustee in charge. H. R. Rep. No. 1409, 75th 
Cong., 1st Sess. , pp. 43- 44. Working under the direction 
of the Court, the reorganization trustee was to make the 
necessary investigations concerning the debtor, the opera-
tion of its business, and the desirability of its continuance 
"and any other matter relevant to the proceeding or to 
the formulation of a plan, and report thereon to the 
judge." 11 U. S. C. § 567 (emphasis added). The re-
organization trustee is, indeed, charged by 11 U. S. C. 
§ 569 with the responsibility of formulating a plan? 
1 11 U . S. C . § 5G9 provides: 
" Where a trustee has been appointed the judge shall fix :t tim e· 
within which the trustee shall prepare and file a plan , or a report 
of his reasonR why a pla n cannot b e effect ed, a nd ~hall fix a 
subsequent time for a hea ring on such plan or report and for the 
consideration of any obj rction~ which may b e made or of such 
nmenclments or plnns as may b e proposed by the debtor or by 
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A Chapter X plan docs not look forward to a dis-
charge of the debtor as does ordinary bankruptcy, but 
rather to an overhaul of its capital structure, a simplifi-
cation of it, if need be. and the determination of the 
fair share which each class of old creditors shall receive 
and \vhat participation, if any, the old stockholders may 
be granted. The test \vhich the Court must ultimately 
apply under Chapter X is whether a plan is "fair and 
equitable, and feasible. " 11 U. S. C. § 574. The test 
of "fair aud equitable" derives from the old equity re-
CC'iverships which was adopted in former § 77B of the 
Bankruptcy Act (all as we discussed in Case v. Los 
Angeles Lumber Products Co., 308 U.S. 106), and which 
was adopted as the test of a reorganization plan under 
Chapter X. As stated in the House Report "the [reor-
ganization l trustee is required to assemble the salient 
facts necessary for a determination of the fairness and 
equity of a plan of reorganization." H . R. Rep. No. 
1409, 75th Cong., 1st Se.:s., 43. 
The requirements of "fair and equitable," which the 
Court must apply, entail the application of the absolute 
priority rule which we discussed at length in Los Angeles 
Lumber Products and which "·as followed in Co11soli-
dated Rock Co. v. DuBois, 312 U. S. 510, under § 77B 
of the Bankruptcy Act. It not only gives creditors full 
priority over stockholders, but protects senior classes of 
creditors against the claim that "junior interests \Yere 
improperly permitted to participate in a plan or were 
too liberally treated therein." 308 U. S., at 118. Un-
secured creditors need not be paid in cash as a condition 
to stockholders retaining an interest in the reorganized 
company, for they may be protected by the issuance "on 
C'quitable terms of income bonds or preferred stock." 
!d., at 117. 
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And as we said in the DuBois case: 
"If the creditors are adequately compensated for 
the loss of their prior claims, it is not material out 
of ·what assets they are paid. So long as they re-
ceive full compensatory treatment and so long as each 
group shares in the securities of the whole enter-
prise on an equitable basis, the requirements of 'fair 
and equitable' are satisfied." 312 U. S., at 530. 
The fare amount of the debentures in litigation here 
was $4.298,200. The damages sought against the in-
denture trustee arc in the same amount. If we assume, 
arguendo, that there is merit in the cause of action and 
that the indenture trustee is fully responsible, one entire 
cla s of security holders is eliminated from any necessary 
consideration in the plan. Or if there is only partial 
recovery, there is a pro rata change in the relative posi-
tions of the various classes of creditors. A plan cannot 
be designed without a final determination of the status 
of the debenture holders vis-a-vis the indenture trustee 
or at least an informed judgment concerning the value 
of that claim. 
It is said that the assets of the debtor were some $21 
million and the liabilities some $00 million. Whether 
conditions have changed so as to leave some equity for 
the old stockholders, we do not know. The rule an-
nounced by the Court today, however, is Hot for this case 
alone but applicable to all reorganizations under Chapter 
X. In some cases the elimination of one entire class 
of creditors or a pro rata reduction in their claims would 
give stockholders a chance to participate in the plan. 
There is no opportunity to make that determination 
without investigation, without a pursuit of claims, and 
their prosecution or settlement. The reorganization 
trustee has full authority to do just that under the direc-
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tion of the Court. And unless he can take those steps, 
he ·will not be able to formulate a plan of reorganization 
for submission to the Court. 
Of course debenture holders or a protective committee 
representing them may in some cases take the lead. 
But Chapter X was written with the view that such mat-
ters should not be left to happenstance. That is why 
the reorganization trustee was made the "focal point" for 
taking an inventory of assets available to the several 
claimants and providing what plan would be fair and 
equitable in light of the security of some claimants or 
the payment of claims rightfully due them.~ 
There is, with all respect, no merit in the argument 
that, if the reorganization trustee recovers against the in-
denture trustee on behalf of the debenture holders, the 
indenture trustee "·ill be subrogated to the debenture 
holders, leaving the total claims affected by the plan 
'vholly unchanged. 
The complaint against the indenture trustee charges 
willful misconduct or gross negligence. What the merits 
may be we of course do not know and intimate no opin-
ion. But if true. the Trust Indenture Act of 1939. 15 
U. S. C. § 77000 gives no immunity.3 
2 Sec HraringR on H. R. 8046, Senate Judiciary Committe<', 75th 
Cong., 2d Sess., 126. 
The ab~olute priority rule was applied in a serif'~ of railroad 
reorganizations. Sec Ecker "· TT'estem Pac. R. Corp., :ns U. S. 
4-t8; Group of Investors v. Milwaukee R. Co., 318 r. S. 523; 
Reconstruction Finance Corp. "· Denver & R. G. 11'. R. Co., 328 
U. S. 495. 
3 While the indrnturr trustee may rel~· on crrtificate~ or opinions 
concerning the truth of statements and the correctness of opinions 
"in the absence of bad faith" (15 U. S. C. § 77000(a)), it is not 
exempt from liability "for its own negligent action, its own negligent 
failure to act, or its own wilful misconduct" ( 15 U. S. C. § 77000 
(d)), save for errors in judgment made in good faith. Ibid. 
(' 
70-220-DISSENT 
CAPLIN v. MARINE MIDLAND GRACE TRUST CO. 5-
We said in Pepper v. Litton, 308 U. S. 295, 307, that 
"the bankruptcy court in passing on allowance of claims 
sits as a court of equity" and we cited the cases showing 
that claimants in a fiduciary position may have their 
claims either wholly disallowed or subordinated. !d.,. 
311, 312. As stated in American Surety Co. v. Bethlehem 
Nat. Bank, 314 U. S. 314, 317, while the surety as "a 
special kind of secured creditor" it is a right that "can be 
availed of only by a surety alert in discharging its 
duty . . . and one not guilty of inequitable conduct." 
The indellture trustee is not, of course, a surety. It 
would have to seek subrogation under the general equi-
table doctrine, stated as follows by the American Law 
Institute.4 
"Where property of one person is used in discharg-
ing an obligation owed by another or a lien upon 
the property of another, under such circumstances 
that the other would be unjustly enriched by the 
retention of the benefit thus conferred, the former is 
entitled to be subrogated to the position of the 
obligee or lien-holder." 
It is not imaginable that any court would ever hold 
that an indenture trustee, found culpably responsible for 
the default on debentures, would be subrogated with re--
spect to funds which otherwise would go to innocent 
creditors or stockholders on the ground that paying 
money to them rather than to it would constitute unjust 
enrichment. A person "who invokes the doctrine of 
subrogation must come into court with clean hands." 
German Bank v. United States, 148 U. S. 573, 581. 
I agree with Judge Kaufman and Judge Hays, dissent-
ing below, and would reverse this judgment. 
'1 Hc::;tatement of Restitution § 162 (1937). 
4/20/72 CEP 
Rea WOD's dissent in No. 70-220, Caplin y. Marine Midland 
Grace Trust Co. of New York 
WJB has joined this dissent. The dissent is well 
written and makes a strong point. I do not think, however, 
that it is so persuasive that you should change your vote. 
CEP 
. c 
.:§u.prtnte <Q:~trt cf tire ~niu~ ;%iht!c£J 
' . 
11ID'aslyington. 'll'l· <.q. 20bfJ!2 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
April 20, 1972 
Re: No. 70-220 - Caplin v. The 
Marine Midland Grace 
Trust Company 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me. 
Since . ely, 
Mr. Justice Douglas 
Copies to Conference 
,ju;n-tme Qftntrt of tltt ~tritcb ~tatcs 
' . 
'J)Jit8lrhtgtott. ~. <!J. 20gt}t-~ 
CHAMBERS OF' 
JUSTICE WM . J . BRENNAN, JR. April 20, 1972 
RE: No. 70-220- Caplin v. Marine Midland 
Grace Trust Co. of New York 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me in your dissent in the 
above. 
Mr. Justice Douglas 
cc: The Conference 
~ttm Q}o:ttrlltf tltt ~b' ~btttg 
JJas-Jri:ttg.hm. ~. (!}. '2ll.?~~ 
CHAMBE:RS OF' 
__. JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN ' 
April 24, 1972 
Re: No. 70-220 - Caplin v. Marine Midland 
Grace Trust Co. 
Dear Bill: 
I, too, am with Learned Hand on this one. 
Please join me in your dissent. 
Sincerely, 
j!ttl· 
Mr. Justice Douglas 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF' 
THE CHIEF .JUSTICE 
.invrttnt <!):curt cf t~t ~t~ .iWtg 
2ID' ItS fri:nghm. !9. <!):. 2 !l.?)!. ,;l 
May 17, 1972 
Re: No. 70-220 - Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co. 
Dear Thurgood: 
Please join me. 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
Copies to the Conference 
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